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Terrorism has dominated the domestic and international landscape since 9/11. Determining what drives people to commit acts of terrorism is no easy task. The important new book fills a gap in the psychology and psychiatry literature by examining the relationship between evil and mental illness, and in particular amongst terrorists. How can evil, a characteristic of human nature, become extreme, intent on destruction and lead to acts of terrorism? Featuring contributions from leading experts in this field, Evil, Terrorism and Psychiatry explores whether there are specific personality traits, psychological characteristics or psychopathological conditions that may favour a lack of control of violence in terrorists. It also offers possible novel prevention strategies to help understand and prevent these acts in future. Featuring articles from a special issue of CNS Spectrums, this book also includes brand new chapters found exclusively in this book.
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No one is willingly evil, but one can become evil for a bad disposition in his body and for a training without a true education; this is hideous for everyone and happens against his will (Plato, Timaeus, 86e). This citation alone would suffice to show how understanding behavior has fascinated humans since ancient times.
Over the last few decades, the development of behavioral neuroscience has fostered the study of the biological correlates that subtend the mental processes involved in moral choices and social behavior. Novel brain-imaging methodologies, including positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and high-resolution electro-encephalography (EEG-mapping), have allowed scientists to adventure into the marvellous morphological and functional architecture of the human brain in an unprecedented manner. Furthermore, techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have made it possible to probe the brain by inducing temporary functional perturbations in selected cortical regions.
At the same time, the decoding of the human genome has paved the way to the study of the role of different genetic alleles in shaping personality, behavior, and vulnerability to mental disorders, as well as to understanding individual variability in response to pharmacological and even to psychotherapeutic interventions.
Neuroscience has proven to be a powerful tool to explore issues across multiple disciplines, ranging from philosophy to ethics, from economics to law, from genetics to psychiatry itself. The dialogue between social and experimental sciences has given renovated vigor to ancient questions. For instance, whether psychopathic criminals should be considered bad or mad is no longer a matter of abstract speculation, but rather has become the object of scientific investigations in which structural and functional measures in brain regions devoted to emotional processing and behavioral control are combined with evaluation of genetic factors that may affect vulnerability to aversive environmental factors during childhood. This nature by nurture interaction in turn may result in increased risk of expressing antisocial and impulsive behavior during adulthood. Recently, novel neuroscience advancements have entered the 2 forensic debate and the law.
In view of evidence coming from neuroscience, the question of the extent to which individuals are free and responsible for their actions has taken on renewed vigor. The issue reconnects to the medieval debate in the ethical and philosophical realm on free will versus determinism, a debate whose echo resonates in the courtroom. The capability to distinguish good from bad and to decide to act in one way or another is the foundation of the criminal justice system. Indeed, on such a foundation, retributive jurisprudence, typical of all modern societies, bases culpability and imputability.
In this perspective, Evil, Terrorism & Psychiatry offers an original and multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of ideological terrorism. What can neuroscience tell us about the mind—or rather, the brain—of suicide bombers? Which psychopathological factors may play a role? To what extent is religious fanaticism just a matter of molecules in the brain? Can neuroscience, psychiatry, and social sciences by working together develop effective strategies to prevent terrorism sinking deep roots within society?
Readers will find themselves viewing this issue from a new angle, no doubt from a much wider perspective than we have become accustomed to hear in the evening news.
Psychiatrist and neuroscientist, Director of IMT School for Advanced Studies in Lucca, Italy, and Head of MoMiLab, Molecular Mind Laboratory, at IMT School
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108467766
© Donatella Marazziti and Stephen M. Stahl 2019
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2019
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marazziti, Donatella, editor. | Stahl, Stephen M., 1951– editor.
Title: Evil, terrorism & psychiatry / edited by Donatella Marazziti, Stephen M. Stahl.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018043274 | ISBN 9781108467766 (pbk.)
Subjects: | MESH: Terrorism – psychology | Suicide – psychology | Violence – psychology
Classification: LCC RC454.4 | NLM WM 172.5 | DDC 616.89–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018043274
ISBN 978-1-108-46776-6 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Every effort has been made in preparing this book to provide accurate and up-to-date information that is in accord with accepted standards and practice at the time of publication. Although case histories are drawn from actual cases, every effort has been made to disguise the identities of the individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors, editors, and publishers can make no warranties that the information contained herein is totally free from error, not least because clinical standards are constantly changing through research and regulation. The authors, editors, and publishers therefore disclaim all liability for direct or consequential damages resulting from the use of material contained in this book. Readers are strongly advised to pay careful attention to information provided by the manufacturer of any drugs or equipment that they plan to use.
Chapter 1 |
Chapter 8 |
---|---|
To Die to Kill: Suicide as a Weapon. Some Historical Antecedents of Suicide Terrorism
|
Brain Alterations Potentially Associated with Aggression and Terrorism
|
Chapter 2 |
Chapter 9 |
The Philosophy of Hate and Anger
|
Political Terrorism and Affective Polarization in “Black” and “Red” Terrorists in Italy During the Years 1968–1988
|
Chapter 3 |
Chapter 10 |
Identity, Alienation, and Violent Radicalization
|
Conditions of Life and Death of Psychiatric Patients in France During World War II: Euthanasia or Collateral Casualties?
|
Chapter 4 |
Chapter 11 |
The Mind of Suicide Terrorists
|
Neuropsychiatric Characteristics of Antiterrorist Operation Combatants in the Donbass (Ukraine)
|
Chapter 5 |
Chapter 12 |
Psychopathology of Terrorists
|
The International Scenario of Terrorism
|
Chapter 6 |
Chapter 13 |
Why is Terrorism a Man’s Business?
|
Identification and Prevention of Radicalization. Practice and Experiences with a Multidisciplinary Working Model
|
Chapter 7 |
Chapter 14 |
Religion, Violence, and the Brain: a Neuroethical Perspective
|
How to Fight Terrorism? Political and Strategic Aspects
|
Dinesh Bhugra
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK
Bernhard Bogerts
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Claudio Bonito
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Stephanie Breitschuh
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Alberto Carrara
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Marina V. Gresko
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Patrick Lemoine
Department of Psychiatry, Clinique Lyon Lumière, Lyon, France
Tatiana K. Loganovskaja
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Konstantin N. Loganovsky
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Donatella Marazziti
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Pisa, and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for Research in Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Icro Maremmani
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, and Santa Chiara University Hospital, Department of Specialty Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Donato Marzano
Italian Navy, Italian Fleet, Rome, Italy
Anne Maria Möller-Leimkühler
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Matteo Pacini
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, Pisa, Italy
Armando Piccinni
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Stefano Salvatori
Departimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Italy
Maria Schöne
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Dorte Sestoft
Ministry of Justice, Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry, Blegdamsvej, Copenhagen, Denmark
Stephen M. Stahl
Department of Psychiatry, University of California at San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA
Guido Traversa
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Erich Vad
Department of International Relations, Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Sciences, Ludwig–Maximilians–University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Antonello Veltri
Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, and Dipartimento della Salute Mentale e Dipendenze, Azienda USL Toscana Nord Ovest, Pisa, Italy
Antonio Ventriglio
Department of Mental Health, Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Foggia, Foggia, Italy
Natalia A. Zdanevich
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Political Terrorism and Affective Polarization in Black and Red Terrorists in Italy During the Years 19681988
The scientific validity of assessments of violent behavior by means of psychiatric categories has always faced two limitations. On one hand, the controversy about giving political beliefs or activity, or violent behavior in general, a label of mental disturbance was seen as an abuse of psychiatric knowledge. Categorizing politics can lead to justifications of the denigration of certain political ideas as being simply delusional or dangerous, which goes beyond simply being in agreement with the prosecution of perpetrators of violent political acts against the existing regime. The second limitation was that psychiatric evaluations of violent political crimes were mostly performed, case by case, in a forensic environment, which made them unduly dependent on categories of presumed dangerousness and legal responsibility, rather than on a clinical definition of their mental status and history. The forensic classification, in other words, hardly went beyond the distinction between psychotic and nonpsychotic offenders.1 Psychological theories, mostly based on only a few cases, have gradually increased in number but never led to further, directly related research.2,3
Our research group has been investigating the role of bipolar-related states in a variety of events and clinical contexts, such as HIV infection, alcohol abuse by depressed and anxious patients, binge eating, substance abuse, and various kinds of addiction. These studies converged in showing that minor, less-than-manic mood states, including temperamental dispositions (cyclothymic and hyperthymic) are related to a wide range of physiological risk behaviors. For such risks to originate in mood orientation, one does not need to think of a major agitated psychotic mania or mixed state: either a dominant temperament or a protracted hypomania is enough to justify an outcome of engagement in a wide range of activities, whether legal or not, possibly, but not necessarily sociopathic or violent.4–8 For instance, addiction to alcohol and/or heroin is related to temperamental cyclothymia, rather than axis I dual diagnosis. The move toward sociopathy itself, at least in some cases, may be the result of physiological risk disposition, in a way that does not require the labeling of the resulting behavior (e.g., political violence) as pathological, but makes it interpretable on psychological/clinical grounds.
This paper’s aim was to illustrate a series of reports and comments and some data concerning the psychological common ground of political terrorism. To be precise, what we mean by “political terrorism” is an organized and intentional activity that has political aims and is practiced by single individuals or, more often, groups of people who are opposed to a dominant majority, within a certain territory. The choice of terrorism can thus be viewed as a kind of subtle, low-intensity, and scattered war that is focused on politics, rather than a classic struggle for territorial control fought out between armies. It sometimes appears as a civil war, or, more often, implies the clandestine activity of a minority, partly because of the impossibility of sustaining a direct military struggle.
On psychiatric grounds, the focus of our interest is not the political content that is prompted by terrorist movements, nor are we understating the fact that violent political confrontation is itself a sign of psychiatric orientation. Instead, we are ready to put forward the idea that formal and transpolitical radical choices, either of an illegal lifestyle or of activities involving major risks, can be linked with certain mental states, especially for small groups living in secrecy showing a high level of internal ideological cohesion and a no-return attitude toward commitment to radical choices.
Terrorists usually act in small units, though “lone wolves” exist as well, who may have clear-cut ideological positions, but they remain isolated on the operational plane. Available data about the psycho(patho)logical profile of terrorists are sparse: the few studies that are readily available are those on identified living terrorists (judging by evidence given in the trials of those who personally admitted to having been terrorists), and the statistical data imply a number of documented cases belonging to the same terrorist organization, or at least in the same political area.
Armed political fighting against the system can be distinguished as belonging to one of at least two subtypes, according to Post.9 On one hand, there are groups fighting for the preservation of their original culture and social environment, in opposition to an enemy that is perceived as “alien,” that is, as a hostile force usurping territory, resources, and rights (possibly in a revolutionary mode) or invading from the outside. In addition, there are groups fighting for revolution, aiming at the subversion of what has been considered as normal, or acceptable. This latter kind of terrorism is directed against an inner enemy, which is antagonized but also has shared root features (familial, cultural, ethnic).
As argued by Post, there seems to be a deep difference between those who aim to subvert their own society, the “world of their fathers,” and those who, in their view, fight to defend their tradition or retaliate against an attack against the “world of their fathers.” The first profile appears to imply a deeper conflict, and a higher level of deviance, among those committed to antitraditional revolutions. Such a statement, as anticipated, does not point to any correspondence between specific contents or a generic judgment of “abnormality” in assessing radicalism, but it suggests that some mental conditions bear a higher likelihood of embracing and engaging in aggressive and outlawed forms of politics, usually on the basis of a radical disagreement with the status quo.
On logical grounds, when terrorists join together as a group, it is quite unlikely that they are in a psychotic state—at least, not all of them at once. It is also unlikely that they feel depressed, or that they are suffering from a severe anxiety disorder, which usually holds people back from making choices, running risks, or engaging in new experiences. Cases of psychotic terrorism take place as isolated attacks, or as very short-lasting participation in group activities. Other categories of mental states show a better fit with a possible long-lasting terrorist activity within the same group, or between similarly oriented groups, which implies a higher level of stability, enduring determination, planning attack campaigns consisting of different actions, and persistent egosynthonia, that is, the situation of someone being convinced that they are fighting to fulfill a right and crucial vow. Mood states of a less-than-manic grade, for instance, would allow an adept to stay within the boundaries of social interaction, military effectiveness, and cautiousness due to a clandestine status, and maintaining a grip on reality, despite an altered set of expectations. The Italian period known familiarly as the “years of lead” displays an interesting viewpoint for the study of terrorist psychology for two main reasons: first, it was a historically defined period (1968–1988); second, the number of ascertained participants in terrorist activities was quite large, especially for the group called the Red Brigades (RBs), the largest European terrorist group known to history. Moreover, a sufficient number of documentaries, interviews, and biographical or true-crime publications are available to allow the possible psychological trajectories of Italian neofascist (right)- and communist (left)-wing extremist groups to be accurately profiled.