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Terrorism has dominated the domestic and international landscape since 9/11. Determining what drives people to commit acts of terrorism is no easy task. The important new book fills a gap in the psychology and psychiatry literature by examining the relationship between evil and mental illness, and in particular amongst terrorists. How can evil, a characteristic of human nature, become extreme, intent on destruction and lead to acts of terrorism? Featuring contributions from leading experts in this field, Evil, Terrorism and Psychiatry explores whether there are specific personality traits, psychological characteristics or psychopathological conditions that may favour a lack of control of violence in terrorists. It also offers possible novel prevention strategies to help understand and prevent these acts in future. Featuring articles from a special issue of CNS Spectrums, this book also includes brand new chapters found exclusively in this book.
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No one is willingly evil, but one can become evil for a bad disposition in his body and for a training without a true education; this is hideous for everyone and happens against his will (Plato, Timaeus, 86e). This citation alone would suffice to show how understanding behavior has fascinated humans since ancient times.
Over the last few decades, the development of behavioral neuroscience has fostered the study of the biological correlates that subtend the mental processes involved in moral choices and social behavior. Novel brain-imaging methodologies, including positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and high-resolution electro-encephalography (EEG-mapping), have allowed scientists to adventure into the marvellous morphological and functional architecture of the human brain in an unprecedented manner. Furthermore, techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have made it possible to probe the brain by inducing temporary functional perturbations in selected cortical regions.
At the same time, the decoding of the human genome has paved the way to the study of the role of different genetic alleles in shaping personality, behavior, and vulnerability to mental disorders, as well as to understanding individual variability in response to pharmacological and even to psychotherapeutic interventions.
Neuroscience has proven to be a powerful tool to explore issues across multiple disciplines, ranging from philosophy to ethics, from economics to law, from genetics to psychiatry itself. The dialogue between social and experimental sciences has given renovated vigor to ancient questions. For instance, whether psychopathic criminals should be considered bad or mad is no longer a matter of abstract speculation, but rather has become the object of scientific investigations in which structural and functional measures in brain regions devoted to emotional processing and behavioral control are combined with evaluation of genetic factors that may affect vulnerability to aversive environmental factors during childhood. This nature by nurture interaction in turn may result in increased risk of expressing antisocial and impulsive behavior during adulthood. Recently, novel neuroscience advancements have entered the 2 forensic debate and the law.
In view of evidence coming from neuroscience, the question of the extent to which individuals are free and responsible for their actions has taken on renewed vigor. The issue reconnects to the medieval debate in the ethical and philosophical realm on free will versus determinism, a debate whose echo resonates in the courtroom. The capability to distinguish good from bad and to decide to act in one way or another is the foundation of the criminal justice system. Indeed, on such a foundation, retributive jurisprudence, typical of all modern societies, bases culpability and imputability.
In this perspective, Evil, Terrorism & Psychiatry offers an original and multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of ideological terrorism. What can neuroscience tell us about the mind—or rather, the brain—of suicide bombers? Which psychopathological factors may play a role? To what extent is religious fanaticism just a matter of molecules in the brain? Can neuroscience, psychiatry, and social sciences by working together develop effective strategies to prevent terrorism sinking deep roots within society?
Readers will find themselves viewing this issue from a new angle, no doubt from a much wider perspective than we have become accustomed to hear in the evening news.
Psychiatrist and neuroscientist, Director of IMT School for Advanced Studies in Lucca, Italy, and Head of MoMiLab, Molecular Mind Laboratory, at IMT School
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It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108467766
© Donatella Marazziti and Stephen M. Stahl 2019
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2019
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marazziti, Donatella, editor. | Stahl, Stephen M., 1951– editor.
Title: Evil, terrorism & psychiatry / edited by Donatella Marazziti, Stephen M. Stahl.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018043274 | ISBN 9781108467766 (pbk.)
Subjects: | MESH: Terrorism – psychology | Suicide – psychology | Violence – psychology
Classification: LCC RC454.4 | NLM WM 172.5 | DDC 616.89–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018043274
ISBN 978-1-108-46776-6 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Every effort has been made in preparing this book to provide accurate and up-to-date information that is in accord with accepted standards and practice at the time of publication. Although case histories are drawn from actual cases, every effort has been made to disguise the identities of the individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors, editors, and publishers can make no warranties that the information contained herein is totally free from error, not least because clinical standards are constantly changing through research and regulation. The authors, editors, and publishers therefore disclaim all liability for direct or consequential damages resulting from the use of material contained in this book. Readers are strongly advised to pay careful attention to information provided by the manufacturer of any drugs or equipment that they plan to use.
Chapter 1 |
Chapter 8 |
---|---|
To Die to Kill: Suicide as a Weapon. Some Historical Antecedents of Suicide Terrorism
|
Brain Alterations Potentially Associated with Aggression and Terrorism
|
Chapter 2 |
Chapter 9 |
The Philosophy of Hate and Anger
|
Political Terrorism and Affective Polarization in “Black” and “Red” Terrorists in Italy During the Years 1968–1988
|
Chapter 3 |
Chapter 10 |
Identity, Alienation, and Violent Radicalization
|
Conditions of Life and Death of Psychiatric Patients in France During World War II: Euthanasia or Collateral Casualties?
|
Chapter 4 |
Chapter 11 |
The Mind of Suicide Terrorists
|
Neuropsychiatric Characteristics of Antiterrorist Operation Combatants in the Donbass (Ukraine)
|
Chapter 5 |
Chapter 12 |
Psychopathology of Terrorists
|
The International Scenario of Terrorism
|
Chapter 6 |
Chapter 13 |
Why is Terrorism a Man’s Business?
|
Identification and Prevention of Radicalization. Practice and Experiences with a Multidisciplinary Working Model
|
Chapter 7 |
Chapter 14 |
Religion, Violence, and the Brain: a Neuroethical Perspective
|
How to Fight Terrorism? Political and Strategic Aspects
|
Dinesh Bhugra
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK
Bernhard Bogerts
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Claudio Bonito
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Stephanie Breitschuh
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Alberto Carrara
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Marina V. Gresko
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Patrick Lemoine
Department of Psychiatry, Clinique Lyon Lumière, Lyon, France
Tatiana K. Loganovskaja
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Konstantin N. Loganovsky
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Donatella Marazziti
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Pisa, and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for Research in Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Icro Maremmani
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, and Santa Chiara University Hospital, Department of Specialty Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Donato Marzano
Italian Navy, Italian Fleet, Rome, Italy
Anne Maria Möller-Leimkühler
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Matteo Pacini
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, Pisa, Italy
Armando Piccinni
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Stefano Salvatori
Departimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Italy
Maria Schöne
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Dorte Sestoft
Ministry of Justice, Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry, Blegdamsvej, Copenhagen, Denmark
Stephen M. Stahl
Department of Psychiatry, University of California at San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA
Guido Traversa
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Erich Vad
Department of International Relations, Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Sciences, Ludwig–Maximilians–University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Antonello Veltri
Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, and Dipartimento della Salute Mentale e Dipendenze, Azienda USL Toscana Nord Ovest, Pisa, Italy
Antonio Ventriglio
Department of Mental Health, Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Foggia, Foggia, Italy
Natalia A. Zdanevich
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Religion, Violence, and the Brain: a Neuroethical Perspective
I think it’s educationally pernicious to fill children’s minds up with falsehoods when the truth is so exciting, about the nature of the universe, where it comes from, things like that. We’re so close to understanding it. But also, of course, religions—not all of them, but some of them—inspire people to do terrible deeds. Because of faith, which by definition requires no evidence. It can be used to justify suicide bombings, beheading apostates, stoning people to death.1
This quote comes from a personal communication of Richard Dawkins to Raphael Lataster. It is easy to perceive from Dawkins’ statement a Western widespread stereotype that links religions with evil, antisocial behaviors. It is not so unusual to hear that religions lead to division, hatred, war, and other evil behaviors in society. The background of this way of thinking on religion and on religious people is at least twofold. From one side, it emphasizes a diachronic portrait of history and philosophy of religion in which this human factor is considered always present when great wars took place, or when atrocities, such as genocides, massacres of ethnics groups, etc., were carried out. This sort of causal correlation, evil happens–people who commit the crime are religious, is very common and is due to the fact that at least 84 per cent of the world’s population belongs to a religion.2
From another perspective, the same stereotype that correlates religion with evil behaviors is based on a false premise that struggles to impose a radical and constitutive dichotomy between science and faith: the so-called “opposition paradigm.”3 According to this belief, only empirical science can achieve and teach “truth,” the only and absolute truth based on evidence; instead, the central pillar of religion, faith, requiring no scientific evidence, would fill people’s minds up with falsehoods.
The controversies over religion being the cause of terrorism and evil behaviors are serious, and extensive effort is required to separate the wheat from the chaff.
Therefore, the first term that we need to clarify is “religion.” For sure, it is a crucial inquiry what a religion is, particularly to Religious Studies scholars. Following Hubert Seiwert, we recognize that for most of the twentieth century, theory in the study of religion was marked by two main approaches: (1) theologically or philosophically informed phenomenology, and (2) social-scientific theories of religion. It was only in the last decade of the twentieth century that a third school of interpretation became prevalent: (3) theories inspired by the natural sciences, predominantly evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and nowadays neuroscience.4 Along these lines of speculation, Loyal Rue attempts to combine all three of these approaches and, at the end, he sees religion as a natural phenomenon that is a by-product of the evolution of the human brain, a sort of a product of biological and cultural evolution with the utmost adaptive value for survival and the well-being of the human species. Starting from almost the same premises as Richard Dawkins’ biological interpretation of religions, Rue’s theory considers religion not as the major obstacle to human flourishing, but instead, as a crucial factor in mankind’s development and a concrete means of enhancing the universal human nature that can be known by examining the evolutionary history of humankind.5,6,7