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Terrorism has dominated the domestic and international landscape since 9/11. Determining what drives people to commit acts of terrorism is no easy task. The important new book fills a gap in the psychology and psychiatry literature by examining the relationship between evil and mental illness, and in particular amongst terrorists. How can evil, a characteristic of human nature, become extreme, intent on destruction and lead to acts of terrorism? Featuring contributions from leading experts in this field, Evil, Terrorism and Psychiatry explores whether there are specific personality traits, psychological characteristics or psychopathological conditions that may favour a lack of control of violence in terrorists. It also offers possible novel prevention strategies to help understand and prevent these acts in future. Featuring articles from a special issue of CNS Spectrums, this book also includes brand new chapters found exclusively in this book.
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No one is willingly evil, but one can become evil for a bad disposition in his body and for a training without a true education; this is hideous for everyone and happens against his will (Plato, Timaeus, 86e). This citation alone would suffice to show how understanding behavior has fascinated humans since ancient times.
Over the last few decades, the development of behavioral neuroscience has fostered the study of the biological correlates that subtend the mental processes involved in moral choices and social behavior. Novel brain-imaging methodologies, including positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and high-resolution electro-encephalography (EEG-mapping), have allowed scientists to adventure into the marvellous morphological and functional architecture of the human brain in an unprecedented manner. Furthermore, techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have made it possible to probe the brain by inducing temporary functional perturbations in selected cortical regions.
At the same time, the decoding of the human genome has paved the way to the study of the role of different genetic alleles in shaping personality, behavior, and vulnerability to mental disorders, as well as to understanding individual variability in response to pharmacological and even to psychotherapeutic interventions.
Neuroscience has proven to be a powerful tool to explore issues across multiple disciplines, ranging from philosophy to ethics, from economics to law, from genetics to psychiatry itself. The dialogue between social and experimental sciences has given renovated vigor to ancient questions. For instance, whether psychopathic criminals should be considered bad or mad is no longer a matter of abstract speculation, but rather has become the object of scientific investigations in which structural and functional measures in brain regions devoted to emotional processing and behavioral control are combined with evaluation of genetic factors that may affect vulnerability to aversive environmental factors during childhood. This nature by nurture interaction in turn may result in increased risk of expressing antisocial and impulsive behavior during adulthood. Recently, novel neuroscience advancements have entered the 2 forensic debate and the law.
In view of evidence coming from neuroscience, the question of the extent to which individuals are free and responsible for their actions has taken on renewed vigor. The issue reconnects to the medieval debate in the ethical and philosophical realm on free will versus determinism, a debate whose echo resonates in the courtroom. The capability to distinguish good from bad and to decide to act in one way or another is the foundation of the criminal justice system. Indeed, on such a foundation, retributive jurisprudence, typical of all modern societies, bases culpability and imputability.
In this perspective, Evil, Terrorism & Psychiatry offers an original and multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of ideological terrorism. What can neuroscience tell us about the mind—or rather, the brain—of suicide bombers? Which psychopathological factors may play a role? To what extent is religious fanaticism just a matter of molecules in the brain? Can neuroscience, psychiatry, and social sciences by working together develop effective strategies to prevent terrorism sinking deep roots within society?
Readers will find themselves viewing this issue from a new angle, no doubt from a much wider perspective than we have become accustomed to hear in the evening news.
Psychiatrist and neuroscientist, Director of IMT School for Advanced Studies in Lucca, Italy, and Head of MoMiLab, Molecular Mind Laboratory, at IMT School
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It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108467766
© Donatella Marazziti and Stephen M. Stahl 2019
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2019
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marazziti, Donatella, editor. | Stahl, Stephen M., 1951– editor.
Title: Evil, terrorism & psychiatry / edited by Donatella Marazziti, Stephen M. Stahl.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018043274 | ISBN 9781108467766 (pbk.)
Subjects: | MESH: Terrorism – psychology | Suicide – psychology | Violence – psychology
Classification: LCC RC454.4 | NLM WM 172.5 | DDC 616.89–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018043274
ISBN 978-1-108-46776-6 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Every effort has been made in preparing this book to provide accurate and up-to-date information that is in accord with accepted standards and practice at the time of publication. Although case histories are drawn from actual cases, every effort has been made to disguise the identities of the individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors, editors, and publishers can make no warranties that the information contained herein is totally free from error, not least because clinical standards are constantly changing through research and regulation. The authors, editors, and publishers therefore disclaim all liability for direct or consequential damages resulting from the use of material contained in this book. Readers are strongly advised to pay careful attention to information provided by the manufacturer of any drugs or equipment that they plan to use.
Chapter 1 |
Chapter 8 |
---|---|
To Die to Kill: Suicide as a Weapon. Some Historical Antecedents of Suicide Terrorism
|
Brain Alterations Potentially Associated with Aggression and Terrorism
|
Chapter 2 |
Chapter 9 |
The Philosophy of Hate and Anger
|
Political Terrorism and Affective Polarization in “Black” and “Red” Terrorists in Italy During the Years 1968–1988
|
Chapter 3 |
Chapter 10 |
Identity, Alienation, and Violent Radicalization
|
Conditions of Life and Death of Psychiatric Patients in France During World War II: Euthanasia or Collateral Casualties?
|
Chapter 4 |
Chapter 11 |
The Mind of Suicide Terrorists
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Neuropsychiatric Characteristics of Antiterrorist Operation Combatants in the Donbass (Ukraine)
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Chapter 5 |
Chapter 12 |
Psychopathology of Terrorists
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The International Scenario of Terrorism
|
Chapter 6 |
Chapter 13 |
Why is Terrorism a Man’s Business?
|
Identification and Prevention of Radicalization. Practice and Experiences with a Multidisciplinary Working Model
|
Chapter 7 |
Chapter 14 |
Religion, Violence, and the Brain: a Neuroethical Perspective
|
How to Fight Terrorism? Political and Strategic Aspects
|
Dinesh Bhugra
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK
Bernhard Bogerts
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Claudio Bonito
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Stephanie Breitschuh
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Alberto Carrara
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Marina V. Gresko
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Patrick Lemoine
Department of Psychiatry, Clinique Lyon Lumière, Lyon, France
Tatiana K. Loganovskaja
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Konstantin N. Loganovsky
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Donatella Marazziti
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Pisa, and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for Research in Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Icro Maremmani
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, and Santa Chiara University Hospital, Department of Specialty Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Donato Marzano
Italian Navy, Italian Fleet, Rome, Italy
Anne Maria Möller-Leimkühler
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Matteo Pacini
G. De Lisio Institute of Behavioural Sciences, Pisa, Italy
Armando Piccinni
Dipartimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa and Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, Lucca, Italy
Stefano Salvatori
Departimento di Medicina Clinica e Sperimentale, Section of Psychiatry, University of Pisa, Italy
Maria Schöne
Salus-Institut, Magdeburg, Germany
Dorte Sestoft
Ministry of Justice, Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry, Blegdamsvej, Copenhagen, Denmark
Stephen M. Stahl
Department of Psychiatry, University of California at San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA
Guido Traversa
Università Europea di Roma, Rome, Italy
Erich Vad
Department of International Relations, Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Sciences, Ludwig–Maximilians–University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Antonello Veltri
Fondazione BRF Onlus – Institute for research in psychiatry and neuroscience, and Dipartimento della Salute Mentale e Dipendenze, Azienda USL Toscana Nord Ovest, Pisa, Italy
Antonio Ventriglio
Department of Mental Health, Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Foggia, Foggia, Italy
Natalia A. Zdanevich
Department of Radiation Psychoneurology, National Research Center for Radiation Medicine of National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
The Philosophy of Hate and Anger
At first glance, it may appear that these elements belong to two different dimensions: on one side there is philosophy, identified as the correct use of rationality, which implies the ability to follow the “veining” path of reality. Plato associated this concept to the ability, possessed by philosophers, to understand relationships between genres. On the opposite side, there is anger, hate, resentment, and violence: these categories, indeed, do not seem to be interpreted on the basis of the philosophical categories.
Violence is generally considered the direct consequence of hate and anger and it seems to be constantly embedded in human nature. Several authors reached this same conclusion in times far away from neuroscience’s findings; Darwin’s hypothesis of the existence of an instrument with selective purposes, and, later on, Lorenz’s reference to violence as a constant behavior belonging to the animal kingdom, including humans.
Philosophy seems to take a step back from all of this. It appears almost as if it does not recognize the phenomenon by choosing to maintain it outside its domains. The same attitude was present among Plato’s commenters. Their evaluations could be carried out in an optimal way only if they were raised “far” from anger and violence. It is almost as if their intent was to avoid contamination and the loss of pureness in thoughts, which represents the highest capacity of evaluation.
One could say that even biblical epics were initiated by a violent act: condemnation of humanity to an earthly and strenuous existence. The background of our story is the murder of Abel by Cain.
Greek tragedians almost absolutized anger and hate when composing and presenting the series of violent and cruel facts making up the primordial myths of creation. As long as we know, those myths were later assimilated by the western Roman Empire until its decadence.
In the Middle Ages, the concept of Theodicy comprised the attempt of justifying from a theological point of view the existing part of evil that hosts hate and violence. Today, theologies, philosophies, and religions are still ashamed of its existence and its aporias.
In fourteenth-century Europe, Meister Eckhart used to preach about the concept of detachment, while passing on the image of a wise man dipped in a serene and contemplative indifference. The German mystic acquired this idea from ancient philosophical schools, and its features can be traced in the first form of stoicism, under different designations such as apàtheia or ataraxia (apathy, ataraxy, imperturbability). These concepts will be found once again in the Christian mindset, which comprises the “Incarnated Logos” and engages against anger and hate, in the doctrinal war that will place wrath among the “seven sins.” On the path to absolutism, this war’s features will gradually give birth to the fundamental conflict between good and evil.
As hate, anger, and violence express irrationality, the philosopher ought to observe them from a distance, in the same way a construction worker must check the progress of his building by looking at it from far away if he wishes to grasp a view of the whole.
As sons and daughters of hate, we have been condemned to live with it since the beginning of our time. We are always close to giving in to this feeling and there is not much we can do about it, except learn to use those tools that we have been given by Reason. Sapere Aude! In Kant’s critique, it is reason itself, though, that was placed on the witness stand and left to the doors of modernity, wearing enlightment’s guise of “progress” with the objective of helping man to escape from his state of minority.
These same concepts were later used by Nietzsche’s nihilist theories. These theories were securely placed on the other side of good and evil, and a glimmer of hope for the birth/rebirth of a better humanity, as a consequence of the death of God.
Similar to myths, religions often expect and demand the dangerous association to violence, anger, and hate. They even place these feelings as distinguishing and founding elements. This is the case of Christianity, a perfect example of the concept exaggerated to the point that, in the apotheosis of a rabid and violent act, violence is unleashed against the incarnated son of God himself.
As already noted, most of the religions belonging to the Ancient Near East and the so-called Abrahamic religions originate from an act of rage and violence. Not to mention the polytheisms of the Classic era, based essentially on enraged and choleric relationships between several members of the Pantheon, which portrayed the gods in a constant state of conflict one with each other.
By juxtaposing it to religion, though, we get a glimpse of something different regarding the essence of hate. Nowadays, we witness the creation of parallel pathways between violence and religions almost on a daily basis, and realise how they can turn out to be dramatically contiguous.
After September 11, 2001, world populations witnessed how lethal and dangerous this combination can be, in a historical time where world peace is threatened by what can be considered the most degraded product of rage and hate. The matrix of terrorism has today revealed its essential religious nature and this alone should be enough to impair our own rationality.
Terrorism itself has changed tune, taking on unedited modalities and making use of a weapon that openly challenges our capacity to think rationally: the human body. The human body, indeed, has become an actual “unconventional weapon,” a tool used to inflict death and pain. One could bitterly hypothesize a sort of post-modern era of terrorism. Today, it imitates contemporary anthropology, leading to an abuse of the body for its malleability and adjustable properties and intensifying the concept by using it to bring pain, death, and desperation. This is how the violence of a rabid act transforms into a moment of glory, becoming martyrdom. Then, hate borders on celebration. As a consequence, those concepts, intrinsic in and approximated to rage, hate, and violence, urgently need a philosophical reinterpretation.
Our opinion is that a philosophical observatory of international experts should be created in order to approach and possibly understand modern terrorism. This observatory should indicate new ways to intervene in our current social reality to guide its evolution away from submerging man himself, by using new perspectives, while processing categories of thought that have been verified in the past.